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THE DRED SCOTT CASE AND JUDICIAL
STATESMANSHIP
EDWARD J. BANDER*
0 N MARCH 6, 1857 the Supreme Court decided the case of Scott
v. Sandford;' a decision which many critics have condemned in the
ensuing years, not only as the flame that lit the fuse that led to
the Civil War, but as an ineradicable blot upon the history of the
United States. For on that infamous date, so they reason, the highest
court in the land not only denied one man and his family freedom
from slavery, but attempted to perpetuate for all time that inherently
evil institution in a country where "all men are created equal." Never-
theless, good law and sound logic paradoxically prevailed in the Dred
Scott case; so much so that the man who wrote the lead. opinion
and who bears the obloquy for its consequences was able to assure
an ex-President, "I have an abiding confidence that this act of my
judicial life will stand the test of time and the sober judgment of
the country."'2 Badly timed, boringly long and innocently political as
Chief Justice Roger B. Taney's opinion in this case may have been,
the fact remains that it was a technically flawless interpretation of
the law in 1857. His reliance upon technical perfection alone, how-
ever, without reference to time, place or people, led Chief Justice
Taney to an interpretation which did the greatest disservice to the
Constitution, the law, and consequently the Supreme Court itself.
Let us examine first the uncontested facts of the case. In 1834,
the plaintiff, Dred Scott, was the slave of one Dr. Emerson of the
United States Army. In that year Dr. Emerson took the plaintiff
from the slave state of Missouri to the free state of Illinois, holding
him in bondage there until April or May of 1836. In 1836 Dr.
Emerson purchased Harriet, who thereafter married Dred, and two
children were born to them. Later in 1836 Dr. Emerson was trans-
ferred to the Territory of Upper Louisiana, which was free territory
according to the Missouri Compromise Act of 1820. There Scott
* Assistant Professor of Law, New York University School of Law. A.B. 1949,
LL.B. 1951, Boston University; M.S. in L.S. 1956, Simmons College.
1. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
2. 3 WARREN, Tim SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 38 (1924).
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remained until 1838, in which year Dr. Emerson returned to Missouri
and sold his slaves to a Mr. Sandford, a citizen of New York and
the defendant in Scott's bid for freedom.
The case was tried first in the Missouri courts. Counsel for the
plaintiff claimed that the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 which pro-
hibited slavery in that territory (including the area which subsequently
became the State of Illinois), and the Missouri Compromise Act of
1820, prohibiting slavery in Upper Louisiana combined to make Scott
a free man, inasmuch as he had been a resident of both areas., This
claim the highest court in the State of Missouri denied.
On the same facts, Scott brought his action before the Circuit
Court of the United States for the District of Missouri. The only
means by which Scott could bring his action into a federal court
necessitated showing "diversity of citizenship," i.e., that the parties
to the action be citizens of different states. Sandford's lawyer, im-
mediately upon the commencement of the action, argued that Scott
was a slave and therefore not a citizen in possession of the right
to bring this action. The court set this claim aside, heard the case
on its merits, but decided against the plaintiff. An appeal brought
the matter before the Supreme Court.
At this point, Associate Justice Nelson was assigned to write
the opinion. Nelson felt that Missouri law should govern the case
and under Missouri law, Scott was a slave. However, three develop-
ments intervened to result in the scrapping of Nelson's opinion, though
it subsequently became one of the six concurring opinions of the
"majority" view.3 First, a Presidential election was drawing near,
and the Court wisely refrained from leaving itself open to charges
of electioneering by decision. Secondly, the dissenting Justices had
gone into the problems of citizenship and constitutionality, two tender
issues which required answering lest the Southern position be de-
faulted by silence. Last and most important, Associate Justice Wayne
felt that this case offered an ideal set of facts for settling once and
for all the controversy on slavery, and he convinced Taney of the
need for such a settlement.
Thus with quixotic bravery Chief Justice Taney, in his opinion,
launched himself into the entire question of slavery and with capable,
coldly precise logic attempted to settle the most fiery, violently partisan,
3. It has been argued that there was no "majority" view in the Dred Scott
decision, i.e., that the only unanimous concurrence among the six concurring Justices
(Catron, Wayne, Nelson, Campbell, Grier and Daniels) consisted of denying Dred
Scott's claim to freedom and that they supported Taney's views on the other issues
in widely varying degrees. The individual opinions of all nine Justices were in-
corporated into the total 240 pages of the decision.
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bitterly emotional crisis that this country has ever faced. There is
little to criticize in his logic, when abstracted from the opinion, for
it may be reduced to sylogisms nearly as concise and indisputable
as one which declares, "Circles are round; this figure is a circle:
therefore, this figure is round." He reasoned thus:
First, to be a citizen within the meaning of the Constitution of
the United States, one must look to the Constitution itself; The
Founding Fathers, having written slavery (in the person of African
Negroes) into the Constitution,4 did not even consider the possibility
of African Negroes becoming citizens: therefore, Dred Scott, an
African Negro, is not a citizen of the United States.
Second, to sue in a federal court under the "diversity clause"
of the Constitution, one must be a citizen; Dred Scott is not a
citizen: therefore, Dred Scott cannot sue in a Federal Court.
Third, slavery is lawful under the Constitution of the United
States; Congress cannot pass laws that are unconstitutional; therefore,
the Missouri Compromise which outlawed slavery in a portion of
our territories, is unconstitutional.
Fourth, the right of property in a slave is distinctly and ex-
pressly affirmed in the Constitution; A citizen can take his property
where he will: therefore, a master's right in his slave cannot be
denied simply because he has crossed into any territory of the United
States with that slave.
Fifth, the status of an individual is determined by the state
where the action is brought; In Missouri, Scott was a slave: there-
fore, Scott's sojourns to other areas could not affect his status in
Missouri, where this case was brought to trial.
In short, with something very close to round circle logic, Taney
had declared that: an African negro could not be a citizen; Scott
could not sue in a federal court; the federal government could not
legislate against slavery in the states or territories; Scott's status in
Missouri was that of a slave and his sojourns in free areas could
not affect that status upon his return to Missouri. Chief Justice
Taney had legally encompassed Dred Scott and the federal govern-
ment was safely removed from the controversy. Outside of an amend-
ment to the Constitution, slavery was now a matter of each state's
conscience. The Supreme Court had acted, and now North and
South, powerless to alter the irrevocable, need but to forget this
quarrel and go back to those that were seemingly less troublesome.
4. See, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES oF AMERICA. ANALYSIS AND
INTERPRETATION 312 (Corwin, ed. 1953).
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On the surface, criticizing Taney amounts to criticizing the Found-
ing Fathers, the Constitution of the United States, the Declaration
of Independence, and a host of state cases, statutes, and practices
including those of abolitionist-ridden Massachusetts. The Chief Justice
had ample precedent for his opinion. And he could not resist the
justifiable jibe that there had been little indignation in the North
toward the practise of slavery, while Northern shipowners accumulated
fortunes in transporting captured negroes from Africa to Southern
ports.
In their dissents, Associate Justices McLean and Curtis pointed
out a line of cases which showed a trace of social enlightenment,
yet by and large it cannot be denied that from 1789 to 1857, the
negro in America had remained legally unrecognized as even a
second class citizen. The verdict of one Southern jurist on the
Taney opinion adequately states the contention of Taney's supporters:
"It is proper to say that notwithstanding the calumny and
abuse which were heaped upon the Chief Justice because of his
decision in the Dred Scott case, as far as we have been able
to discover not one statement of fact or principle of law as
set forth by him in that opinion has ever been successfully con-
troverted."5
It is significant, however, that Taney, in his efforts to settle
once and for all the whole issue of slavery, chose to make use of
many procedural devices which the Supreme Court today would
very likely consider unnecessary and even ill-advised in such a de-
cision. In fact, today's Court might well leave off where Taney
began, i.e., if it had established that Scott had no right to sue in a
federal court, it would not assume the necessity for settling any other
issue. As Justice Frankfurter said, ". . . the most fundamental
principle of constitutional adjudication is not to face constitutional
questions but to avoid them, if at all possible."" Taney could have
avoided the whole issue of the constitutionality of the Missouri Com-
promise,7 the most tender point in the entire case, by never even
raising it - or by simply following the Nelson view.
5. Christian, Roger Brooke Taney, 46 AMERICAN LAW Rtvixw 14 (1912).
6. United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 320 (1946).
7. "The power [to declare an act unconstitutional] was not again exercised
until Taney's condemnation of the Missouri Compromise in holding that the due
process clause of the Fifth Amendment prevents Congress from forbidding slavery
in the Territories. This was a monstrous piece of judicial effrontery in the Dred
Scott case, when the Northwest Ordinance had forbidden slavery and when free
states, notwithstanding due process clauses in their state constitutions, had never
had their power questioned. Taney may have thought that he could stifle sectional
strife by his partisan promulgation, but he succeeded only in fostering what he
SUMMER 1961]
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Today, moreover, even from the purely technical standpoint,
Taney's reasoning on this most crucial issue in the Dred Scott de-
cision would be subject to criticism. If a court today must face
a constitutional issue involving a federal law it maintains a strong
presumption toward the constitutionality of that law. This presump-
tion Taney obviously did not share in declaring the Missouri Com-
promise unconstitutional, and though he acknowledged that the Con-
stitution speaks of Congress making "needful rules and regulations"
for the territories, he maintained that this provision applied only to
territories already acquired when the Constitution was written. Sub-
sequent acquisitions were, he reasoned, subject to the same consti-
tutional limitations which applied to the states. A fine distinction,
and an example of how exceedingly narrow Taney's logic grew in
some of the issues upon which he had chosen to build - so much
so that we begin to see how he might as easily and as consistently
have chosen a broader and far different line of reasoning through-
out.
Aside from the technical aspects of his views on the Missouri
Compromise, it is worth noting that Taney had to go back over
fifty years for his only precedent in declaring a federal law un-
constitutional - Chief Justice John Marshall's 1803 decision in the
case of Marbury v. Madison.'
Let us compare Taney's action with Marshall's. Both men acted
boldly. Both enraged a political party. However, the differences are
more fundamental. Marshall was dealing with a theoretical question
which was not likely to arouse the discontented. Taney was dealing
with a political and economic question which had been smoldering for
a generation. Marshall was not settling any issue by his act. He
was simply, and significantly, creating a balance which gave each
department of government a check on the others; and in denying a
political compatriot his commission, he showed the give and take of
a judicial statesman. Taney, in a situation where even compromise
had failed, attempted to settle in completely uncompromising fashion
an issue with which the President, Congress, and the Websters, Clays
meant to forestall. This I venture to think, has not been the only instance in
which this important Supreme Court power has been unwisely exercised." POWELL,
VAGARIES AND VARITIXS IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATIoN 20 (1956).
8. 5 U.S. (1 Cr.) 137 (1803). Marshall had declared that the Supreme Court
had no jurisdiction to order Secretary of State Madison to deliver the commission
which outgoing President John Adams had prepared for a lame-duck appointee
named Marbury; he then exercised his judicial license to declare that an Act of
Congress which had attributed such jurisdiction to the Court unconstitutional, and
thereby established the doctrine of judicial review. For a current discussion of this
and other landmark cases on judicial review, and indirectly a probe on great
decision writing, see McCLosK4Y, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT (1960).
[VOL. 6: p. 514
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and Calhouns had grappled long and unsuccessfully. Marshall, by
his act, established the priceless and enduring doctrine of judicial re-
view - a valuable end in itself. Taney was werely using this doc-
trine as a means to an end - the unenviable one of protecting the
practice of slavery.9
It is interesting to note, moreover, that Taney had taken the
greatest pains to declare unconstitutional an act which had already
been repealed (by the Kansas-Nebraska Act of May 30, 1854). His
obvious intent in so doing was, of course, to preclude the possibility
of any future legislation similar to the Missouri Compromise, and
the end result of his reasoning spelled sheer disaster to the abolitionist.
Slavery had not only been once more legally affirmed, but never
again would an appeal to Congress - let alone the federal courts
- be permissible! This denial of any further recourse was more
than Taney had right or reason to impose on the anti-slavery mind.
It is difficult to believe that the Chief Justice could not have
foreseen the consequences of his decision, and yet it is as if he
wrote it in a political and social vacuum, oblivious to the conditions
of his day and the limited power of the Supreme Court to enforce
its decisions, as well as the flesh and blood which he was relegating
to perpetual slavery. Even a foreign observer, de Tocqueville, 1° could
point out the explosively political nature of Supreme Court decisions
to which Taney paid so little heed. During that pre-Civil War
period when North and South were engaged in a relentless word
war, fair decisions by the Court were likely to offend both sides,
and always offended one. The Court was being constantly abused,
its members scandalously attacked by the press, and at times its
decisions were even disregarded. There was talk in the North of
nullification and, inconceivable as it may seem, of interposition."
Taney was astute enough to postpone announcing the decision
until after the election, and yet he chose the day after Buchanan's
inauguration to deliver an opinion which, coupled with the election
of a man the abolitionists detested, would appear to the North, as
9. For a general discussion of judicial statesmanship see Hofstadter & Levitan,
Four Chief Justices - A Study in Judicial Statesmanship, 143 N.Y.L.J. 4 (1960).
Also republished separately. See also, Professor Schlesinger's discussion of the
"Gold Clause Cases," -THn POLITICS OV UPHEAVL 258 (1960) where he describes
an attempt by Chief Justice Hughes to hew a course between the unprecedented
solution of Marshall and the tactical approach of Taney.
10. "The Supreme Court is placed at the head of all known tribunals, both
by the nature of its rights and the class of justiciable parties which it controls. The
peace, the prosperity and the very existence of the Union are placed in the
hands of the Judges." I DSMOCRACY IN AMERICA 149 (1899).
11. See, Crownover, The Segregation Cases: A Deliberate and Dangerous
Exercise of Power, 42 A.B.A.J. 728 (1956).
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Lincoln suggested, a cloaked conspiracy to throttle the country with
slavery. Prior to the Dred Scott decision the Supreme Court was
at low ebb among the citizenry; subsequently, it was to plummet to
such a depth that the time honored right of habeas corpus could be
suspended with little fear of Court reprisal.' 2 Had he paid sufficient
need to the storm warnings, Taney might have foreseen such effects
mushrooming uncontrollably from his decision.
It is interesting to speculate on the possible effects which one
of the dissenting opinions in the Dred Scott decision might have
had upon the population of the day and the history of our country,
had it prevailed as the majority view. Passing over Justice McLean's
dissent (he was seeking through it a presidential nomination), no
personal motivation can be attributed to dissenter Benjamin R. Curtis,
beyond his conscientious desire to uphold the Constitution.13 Curtis
was a conservative man who had at one time unsuccessfully defended
the right of a slaveholder to bring his slave into Massachusetts. He
had, moreover, supported Chief Judge Lemuel Shaw's opinion up-
holding the Fugitive Slave Law in Massachusetts. In both these
instances, Curtis had looked to the Constitution for guidance. Fol-
lowing the same star in the Dred Scott case, Curtis arrived at an
opinion which Southerners regarded as a complete about face, and
Northerners, as his only "honest" act.' 4
He maintained that Dred Scott's claim to citizenship had not
been disproven, and in his mind, there was nothing in the Con-
stitution which explicitly denied an African Negro citizenship. He
considered Taney's excursion into the constitutionality of the Missouri
Compromise an abuse of his office, foreshadowing the Frankfurter
caveat on avoiding constitutional issues, with the statement, "A great
question of constitutional law, deeply affecting the peace and welfare
of the country, is not, in my opinion, a fit subject to be thus reached."'"
Curtis' opinion was no "Uncle Tom's Cabin" tract on slavery.
It was a compromise view which allowed for both slavery and citizen-
ship of the Negro. Yet, one may consider the possibility that such
a compromise might have pacified both sides long enough to allow
the economic weaknesses of the slavery system to become self-evident
in the South, or the power of the North to spiral to such a degree
that the South would not have dared to commence hostilities.
12. 3 Warren, op. cit. supra note 2, at 90-96.
13. For detailed information on Justice Curtis see, A MEMOIR ov BENJAMIN
ROBBINS CURTIS (1879).
14. Perry, LIVE AND LETTERS or HENRY LEE HIGGINSON 110 (1921).
15. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 590 (1857).
[VOL. 6: p. 514
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There are some jurists who would maintain that Taney's opin-
ion subsequent to deciding that Dred Scott had no right to bring
his action in a Federal Court was nothing more than verbiage and
not binding in future cases, i.e., obiter dicta, merely a judge's passing
comments. Inasmuch as judicial license attaches to this practice,
which preceded and followed Taney, there has been a tendency to
be overly critical of his use of this particular device. However,
obiter dicta was only one of the network of technicalities which
Taney called upon in his eagerness to delve deeper into the many
waters of the slavery question. Judicial restraint should have dic-
tated to the Chief Justice that while great decisions are not born
in Heaven, neither are they the offspring of technicalities.
Up to this point we have been trying to suggest how the flaw
in Taney's opinion was not one of legal technique but rather how,
in its narrowness, it bore no reference to time, place, or people.
Let us turn now to what emerges as the most specifically grievous
aspect of the Taney decision, its "backward look." The narrowness
of the legal stand which Taney chose to take, regardless of its
technical perfection and logic, remains mysteriously inexcusable,
for it virtually made the Constitution a dead letter, with provisions
inflexible and unadaptable to changing times and circumstances. "When
an eighteenth century constitution forms the charter of liberty of
a twentieth century government," said a judge in a 1911 decision,
"must its general provisions be construed and interpreted by an
eighteenth century mind in the light of eighteenth century conditions
and ideals? Clearly not. This were to command the race to halt
in its progress, to stretch the state upon a veritable bed of Procrustes."1
It was the underlying "conditions and ideals" of the year 1789
which Taney attempted to freeze into the constitution forever. In
its general provisions, the possibility of slaves becoming citizens
was not even considered and, in effect, Taney was maintaining that
if the possibility was not considered in 1789, it could not, ipso facto,
be considered in 1857, nor at any time thereafter! Now, though it
is an unfortunate, if understandable, fault of human nature that
it allows the horse and buggy to be replaced by the automobile and
the ice-box by the refrigerator, while it continues to regard with
suspicion and hostility new social ideas, no matter how sound or
necessary, we must demand more from our Supreme Court Justices
than that they seal such clouded reasoning into the Constitution. "We
must never forget," wrote Chief Justice Marshall, "that it is a
16. Borgnis v. Falk Co., 147 Wis. 327, 349-50, 133 N.W. 209, 215-16 (1911).
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Constitution we are expounding . . . a Constitution intended to
endure for ages to come, and consequently to be adapted to the
various crises of human affairs."' 7 Taney ignored the necessity for
adapting that Constitution to the worst crisis which had ever arisen
in human affairs in our history.
There were men who sat on the Supreme Court bench after
Taney who contributed much to a more enlightened view of the
law than it is, perhaps, fair to have expected from Taney in his
day, yet what a difference their kind of reasoning might have made
in that crucial decision. Holmes could have answered Taney's fifty-
five page opinion with a brief, "The life of the law has not been
logic; it has been experience."'" And Brandeis, who had pointed
out the compatibility of social data and rules of law, had this to
say about a Supreme Court making dogma out of doctrine:
"It is a peculiar virtue of our system of law that the process
of inclusion and exclusion so often employed in developing a
rule, is not allowed to end with its enunciation and that an
expression in an opinion yields later to the impact of facts un-
foreseen."' 9
The application of the Holmes-Brandeis philosophy is nowhere
more evident than in the Supreme Court decision on desegregation.2 °
The rule of "separate but equal" (found nowhere in the Constitution
and constantly violated by its adherents) has finally yielded after
over a half century of experience to a rule more consistent with
American ideals. Men like Holmes and Brandeis wrote growth into
the Constitution; Taney, in the Dred Scott decision, attempted to
create a Maginot line.
17. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 315, 407, 415 (1819).
18. HOLMES, THn COMMON LAW 1 (1881). While this author has no insight
into how Justice Holmes would have decided the segregation cases, which will be
touched on later, many have interpreted his insistence that states be allowed to
experiment without Supreme Court interference without taking into account his
statement in Laurel Hill Cemetery v. San Francisco, 216 U.S. 358, 336 (1910)
"The plaintiff must wait until there is a change of practice or at least an estab-
lished concensus of civilized opinion before it can expect this court to overthrow the
rules that the lawmakers and the court of his own state uphold." Professor
Llewellyn's views should also be heard "Its [writing the Grand Style] very
existence has been obscured and buried by the incursion later of a way of work in
which the appellate judges sought to do their deciding without reference to much
except the rules, sought to eliminate the impact of sense, as an intrusion, and
sought to write their opinions as if wisdom (in contrast to logic) were hardly a
decent attribute of a responsible appellate court." LLEWFLLYN, THE COMMON LAW
TRADITION 5, 6 (1960).
19. Jaybird Mining Co. v. Weir, 271 U.S. 609, 619 (1926).
20. Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1955); Brown v. Board of
Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
[VOL. 6: p. 514
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And yet, it is interesting to note that Taney's opinions were
not characterized by blind obedience to the past, contrary to the im-
pression which one receives throughout the Dred Scott decision. In
a prior decision,2 for example, the Court had been asked to rule
on whether or not it had jurisdiction over an admiralty action which
had occurred on the Great Lakes. Taney acknowledged in his opin-
ion that, at the time the Constitution was written, the Founding
Fathers accepted the English law which explicitly defined navigable
waters as those affected by the ebb and flow of the tide, and that
there was already on record a Supreme Court opinion affirming that
such was the law of this land. In this case, however, Taney brushed
aside hoary precedents, ruling that we could not be bound by an
interpretation which ignored new and unforeseen conditions such as
those created by our inland states and their advantages. It would be
quite absurd, he reasoned, to deny the navigability of the Great
Lakes merely because they did not respond to the pull of the sun.
How unfortunate that he could not bring such reasoning to bear
in the Dred Scott case.22
The preceding discussion may serve to point up the irony and
even the tragedy of the statement which Taney wrote on August
29, 1857, to ex-President Pierce. Far from standing "the test of
time and the sober judgment of the country," consider what this
one decision did to the reputation of the jurist who wrote it. Taney
was accused of conspiring with Southern leaders, his attitude toward
the Negro was maliciously distorted, and he was labelled an implacable
states righter. Yet in reality, Taney was the epitome of proper per-
sonal conduct and integrity, he had not only manumitted but sub-
sequently supported the slaves he had inherited, and his leanings
toward states rights served as a valuable counter-balance to the
strong centralism of Chief Justice Marshall. Moreover, the four-
teenth amendment, granting citizenship to all persons born in the
United States, has removed any Taney taint from the Constitution
and rendered the slavery aspect of the Dred Scott decision meaning-
21. Propeller Gennesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443 (1851).
22. ". . . the office of Justice of the Supreme Court similarly calls for an under-
standing, almost intuitive, of the judicial function. A Supreme Court Justice must
be able to distinguish between those cases which call for exercise of the normal
judicial process in which decision is based on precedent and the usual tools of
interpretation, and those rare but great cases which call for the higher skills neces-
sary to the growth and development possible under a living constitution." McKay.
Selection of United States Supreme Court Justices, 9 KAN. L. REv. 109, 135(1960). President Theodore Roosevelt, not an entirely reliable guide on matters
judicial, expressed a similar thought, "The Judges of the Supreme Court of the
land must be not only great jurists, they must be great constructive statesmen, and
the truth of what I say is illustrated by every study of American statesmanship."
BENT, JUSTIce OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES 252 (1932).
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less, so that it is today but a page in history. The fact remains,
nevertheless, that on that page is recorded the low mark of Supreme
Court prestige in this country, and the whole unfortunate event is
best summed up in the words of one of the great constitutional au-
thorities, Edward S. Corwin: "The Dred Scott decision . . . can
and must be written down as a gross abuse of trust by the body
which rendered it.
' 23
Let us point out in closing that it has not been the purpose
of this article to speculate on Justice Taney's personal motivation,
or lack of it, in deciding the Dred Scott case. The legal market
is today flooded with behavioral accounts of why judges act the
way they do based on mischievous theories that would do better
in gossip columns than under the university imprint. The significant
conclusion which emerges from our discussion is that Taney -
whether deliberately or naively it is left for others to debate -
wove an opinion of deadly rigid technicality which did the gravest
injustice of all to the Constitution of the United States. Great minds
before, as well as after Taney, have been quick to realize that the
Constitution must forever remain a living, flexible doctrine, able to
be expanded and adapted to new or changing conditions, if it to
continue serving the purpose which the Founding Fathers intended
it to serve and which they set themselves to achieve with their blood
and their most cherished ideals for all future generations.
23. Corwin, The Dred Scott Decision in the Light of Contemporary Legal
Doctrine 17 AM. HIST. Rlv. 68 (1911).
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